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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

MAURIA TANNER (Swensen),
Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPELLATE CASE
No. 940079-CA

v.
CIVIL CASE
No. 924902803DA

JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR.,
Defendant and Appellee,

PRIORITY NO. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
from a decree of divorce pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended).
This appeal was brought by Mauria Tanner (Swensen),
Plaintiff, from a final judgment and Amended Decree of Divorce
entered on or about February 22, 1994, in the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its

discretion in its division of the marital property.
II.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion

in its award of alimony.
III. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its
discretion by imputing income to Ms. Tanner.
IV.

Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its

discretion in recognizing income to Ms. Tanner from distributions
received from her interest in a family corporation.
V.

Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its

discretion in limiting Ms. Tanner's award of alimony.
VI.

Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its

discretion in declining to award either party attorney fees.
VII. Issue; Whether the trial court acted within its
discretion disallowing both parties' presentation of closing
argument.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court should modify a decree of the district
court only "if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion."

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Any relevant text of statutory provisions or rules pertinent
2

to the resolution of the divorce issues presented for review is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce which was tried before the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Court Judge, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on December 16, 1993.
Amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of
divorce were entered on February 22, 1994. The submitted amended
findings of fact were drafted by counsel for Appellee, Mr.
Swensen.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellant Mauria Tanner ("Ms. Tanner") and Appellee
James G. Swensen, Jr. ("Mr. Swensen") were married on November
22, 1974 (Record (hereinafter "R.") at 23).
2.

The parties have four children, Alison who was 18 at the

time of the divorce, Nathan who was 17, Clare who was 13 and
Tanner who was 9. (R. 24).
3.

Ms. Tanner has a bachelor's degree in art which she

received from BYU in 1989.

(R. 22). Ms. Tanner also received a

secretarial degree from BYU in 1976.
4.

Id.

Mr. Swensen is a tax attorney and Certified Public

Accountant.

He also has a Masters Degree in Accountancy.
3

(R.

23-24) .
5.

Ms. Tanner was employed full time while Mr. Swensen was

in law school from 1979 to 1982.
6.

(R. 59).

Beginning in 1979, Ms. Tanner was employed as a graduate

assistant and secretary at a rate of $6.00 per hour.
7.

(R. 23-24).

During law school Mr. Swensen worked as a graduate

instructor earning between $1,500 and $2,000 each semester.

(R.

142) .
8.

Mr. Swensen also received assistance from his parents

during law school.
9.

(R. 25, 142).

Mr. Swensen's parents assisted in the purchase of the

Crest View residence.

Mr. Swensen's parents made payments on the

house while Mr. Swensen was in law school.
10.

(R. 142).

The parties' purchased the Crest View residence and

also paid law school expenses with proceeds received from the
sale of a vehicle which was Mr. Swensen's pre-marital property.
(R. 186).
11.

Regarding the expert testimony on the value of Mr.

Swensen's law practice, the trial court found the testimony of
Mr. Swensen's expert, Mr. Shields, more credible.

(Transcript of

Judge's Ruling (hereinafter "Tr.") at 2-3).
12.

Mr. Shields performed several evaluations of sole law

practitioners in the past.

(R. 116).
4

13.

Mr. Shields made an on-site inspection at Mr. Swensen's

law office of the equipment, furniture, and fixtures.
14.

(R. 117).

Mr. Shields considered an on-site inspection of the

property essential for an accurate valuation of the present
condition of the equipment, furniture, and fixtures.
15.

(R. 120).

Ms. Tanner's expert failed to inspect the property, had

no personal experience in valuing a law firm, and prepared
several different valuations, some of which used improper
calculations.
16.

(R. 8-10).

Ms. Tanner's expert also failed to discount aged

account receivables, although it was his general practice to do
so.

(R. 10).
17.

Mr. Swensen inspected the marital property located at

the Lincoln Lane residence several days before trial and compiled
a partial listing and valuation of the property. (R. 110).
18.

Mr. Swensen valued the parties' automobiles by current

Blue Book value.
19.

Id.

Mr. Swensen valued the Lincoln Lane residence pursuant

to a recent appraisal of the house and real property admitted as
evidence.
20.

(R. 112).
Mr. Swensen's proposed property distribution valued the

marital property in Ms. Tanner's possession at the time of trial
with a net value of $5,000 over the marital property in his
5

possession.
21.

(R. 110, 155-56).

Ms. Tanner owns an eight percent (8%) interest in a

family corporation, Tanner, Inc., which value was not included in
the marital estate.
court.
22.

Only its income was considered by the trial

(R. 86).
Tanner, Inc. has a large number of valuable assets

including:

3,500 acres in the high New Mexico desert, 150 head

of beef cattle, $125,000 in vehicles and equipment, a $305,000
contract balance, a $4,700 checking account, and a $24,700 money
market account.
23.

(R. 84-86).

The approximate value of Ms. Tanner's eight percent

(8%) interest in Tanner, Inc. assets is at least $36,758, plus an
eight percent (8%) ownership interest in 3,500 acres in the high
New Mexico desert and 150 head of beef cattle.
24.

(R. 84-86).

In combination with the other assets, Ms. Tanner owns

an eight percent (8%) interest in the $305,000 contract balance
from Tanner, Inc.'s sale of a trading post that is payable over
ten years with interest.
25.

(R. 85).

In 1992 and in 1993, Ms. Tanner received income

distributions from Tanner, Inc. in the amount of $8,000 per year.
(R. 48-49).
26.

Ms. Tanner's comment that she was informed by her

father she will not be receiving any more large disbursements
6

from the Tanner, Inc. was objected to and sustained as hearsay.
(R. 51, 98).
27.

Thus, the record is devoid of facts that Ms. Tanner

will not receive such payments from the Tanner, Inc. in the
future.
28.

(R. 83, 84 & 86).
The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner approximately one-

half the parties' marital property ($92,000) and awarded Mr.
Swensen a similar amount.
29.

Ms. Tanner received the Lincoln Lane residence and its

total equity.

Her own appraiser found that the house was not in

need of repair.
30.

(Tr. 5).

(R. 80).

Mr. Swensen is presently renting an unfurnished house.

(R. 142).
31.

Mr. Swensen has paid attorney's fees in the amount of

$3,000 - $4,000 from his one-half share of the marital estate.
(R. 163).
32.

Mr. Swensen's attorney fees were charged against his

portion of the marital property, were not charged against Ms.
Tanner's portion of marital property, and the payment of attorney
fees by Mr. Swensen did not reduce the total marital property to
be distributed between the parties since he added the amount paid
back into his proposed distribution.
33.

(R. 185-186.)

Prior to representation by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner
7

paid her former attorneys' fees in the amount of $5,000 from
marital property. (R. 67).
34.

The parties' only marital debts at the time of

separation of the parties were a student loan and a mortgage on
the Lincoln Lane residence.
35.

(R. 139).

Ms. Tanner testified that she should bear one-half of

the liability of marital debts and obligations.
36.

(R. 62).

During the parties marriage, a student loan was

incurred to finance law school and pay for living expenses.

(R*

141) .
37.

Mr. Swensen used marital funds to pay off the marital

debt of a student loan to Student Loan Servicing Corporation in
the approximate amount of $10,996.
38.

Ms. Tanner testified to monthly expenses in the amount

of $2,885.00.
39.

Id.

Ms. Tanner pays her credit card balances and bills

monthly and has no debt.
40.

(R. 168).

(R. 60).

Ms. Tanner recently purchased a computer for $1,500.

(R. 63).
41.

Ms. Tanner expended funds in the amount of $2,800 for

herself and her daughter to enroll in a voluntary self-esteem
training course. (R. 88-89).
42.

Ms. Tanner has also paid charitable contributions in
8

the amount of $1,600.
43.

Ms. Tanner is presently attending school for

retraining.
44.

(R. 99).

(R. 93).

Ms. Tanner is voluntarily underemployed and voluntarily

enrolled at the University of Utah in a graduate program which
she will complete within one to two years from the time of trial
gaining a Master's Degree in Expressive Therapy.
45.

(R. 23-24, 60).

If Ms. Tanner elects not to write a thesis in

conjunction with her Master's degree, she may finish the program
within one year from the time of trial.
46.

(R. 95).

Ms. Tanner testified at trial that upon graduation she

expects to be paid a starting salary of $20,000 per year.

(R.

94) .
47.

Whether there is any particular intention on the part

of Ms. Tanner to pursue a Ph.D. following graduation from her
Master's program is clearly speculation. (R. 99 - 100).
48.

Ms. Tanner has a history of working during the summer

teaching art and is capable of earning $1,500 yearly doing so.
(Tr. 3).
49.

Ms. Tanner has voluntarily elected not to teach the

summer art classes which she has taught in the past.
50.

(R. 87).

Additionally, Ms. Tanner has received a $2,500 non-

taxable student stipend.

Id.

The stipend Ms. Tanner received
9

was in the amount of $500 per month from August through December,
1993.

(R. 132).
51.

The trial court imputed income to Ms. Tanner in the

amount of $1,000 per month based upon her income from teaching
art, her student stipend, and her distributions from Tanner, Inc.
(Tr. 3-4).
52.

Ms. Tanner testified that she received a distribution

of income from Tanner, Inc., not a distribution of assets. (R.
90) .
53.

Ms. Tanner also testified that Mr. Swensen, a Certified

Public Accountant, prepared the parties' tax returns during the
marriage.
54.

(R. 86).
Each year Ms. Tanner received a Form K-l from Tanner,

Inc. allocating taxes for her to pay in proportion to her eight
percent (8%) ownership interest.
55.

(R. 104-105).

The Form K-l allocates items of income, gain and loss

deduction to individual shareholders of Tanner, Inc. in
proportion to their stock ownership.
56.

(R. 105).

Form K-l reports taxable income that the shareholders

would include in their individual income tax returns.
57.

Id.

The Form K-ls submitted into evidence show that Ms.

Tanner received distributions with respect to income, rather than
distributions of assets from Tanner, Inc., in the amounts of
10

$2,000 for 1989, $2,000 for 1990, $4,000 for 1991, $8,000 for
1992, and $8,000 for 1993.
58.

(R. 131).

The trial court found that Ms. Tanner's eight percent

(8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. was preinheritance/premarital property.
59.

(Tr. 5-6).

The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner $700 alimony per

month for a period of two years. (Tr. 5).
60.

Mr. Swensen has a gross monthly income of $5,625.00,

disposable earnings of $3,671.00 and monthly expenses in the
amount of 2,108.00.
61.

(Tr. 3-4).

The trial court concluded that Mr. Swensen cannot pay

any more than $700 per month in alimony.
62.

Mr. Swensen is paying $1,286 for his child support

obligation.
63.

(Tr. 4).

(Tr. 4).

In addition to child support and alimony, Mr. Swensen

is presently paying tuition for the parties' oldest daughter in
the amount of $3,200 per year.
64.

Ms. Tanner retained three different attorneys to

represent her in this matter.
65.

(R. 147).

(R. 35).

Ms. Tanner testified that the first two attorneys who

represented her were unqualified to handle her divorce.

(R. 35-

36) .
66.

Prior to representation by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner
11

paid her former attorneys fees in the amount of $5,000 from
marital funds.
67.

(R. 35).

The trial court found that neither party demonstrated

the ability to pay the other spouse's attorney's fees.
68.

(Tr. 6).

Ms. Tanner did not testify regarding her need for

attorney's fees or her inability to pay her attorney's fees in
her direct examination or otherwise.
presented respecting her need.
69.

Therefore, no evidence was

(R. 192).

The trial court specifically found that Ms. Tanner had

sufficient assets from Tanner, Inc. and otherwise with which to
pay her attorney fees. (Tr. 6).
70.

The trial court further found that there was no

evidentiary basis from which to make an award for attorney's
fees.

(Tr. 6).
71.

The trial court disallowed both parties from presenting

closing argument.

(R. 192).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its

division of the marital property.

The trial court has broad

discretion in valuing and distributing marital property.

Based

upon the evidence presented, the trial court's award reflects an
equitable division of the parties' marital estate, each party
receiving one-half of the value of the marital property.
12

II.

The trial court properly considered and applied the

Jones factors in awarding alimony.

Sufficient evidence exists to

support the trial court's findings and application of all of the
Jones factors including:

(1) Ms. Tanner's financial condition

and needs in light of the lifestyle she has enjoyed; (2) Ms.
Tanner's ability to support herself; and (3) Mr. Swensen's
ability to pay alimony.
III.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

imputing income to Ms. Tanner.

Ms. Tanner's imputed income from

teaching art classes and from Tanner, Inc. was soundly based upon
her historical earnings, her education, her marketable skills,
etc., as set forth in her testimony.
IV.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

assessing Ms. Tanner income received from her ownership interest
in Tanner, Inc.

The trial court properly awarded Ms. Tanner her

eight percent (8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. free and
clear of any claim by Mr. Swensen and did not consider its value
in awarding and dividing the marital property.

However, the

facts of Ms. Tanner's historical income from Tanner, Inc. clearly
provided an evidentiary basis for recognizing her distributions
as actual income received.
V.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting

the award of alimony to two years.
13

The trial court carefully

weighed the Jones factors in its decision to limit Ms. Tanner's
award of alimony to two years, using the evidence regarding her
need, her ability to provide for her needs, and Mr. Swensen's
ability to pay.
VI.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its

failure to award either party attorney's fees.

The trial court

made a specific finding that there was no evidentiary basis from
which to award attorney's fees and that Ms. Tanner had sufficient
assets with which to pay her own fees, and ruled accordingly.
Also, Ms. Tanner paid approximately $5,000 of her attorneys fees
from marital property.

Ms. Tanner received one-half of the

marital estate, plus approximately $36,758 in value from Tanner,
Inc. together with an eight percent (8%) interest in the unknown
value of 3,500 acres of real property, 150 head of beef cattle,
and all income derived therefrom.
VII.

There was no abuse of discretion in disallowing both

parties' presentation of closing argument.

The trial judge has

discretion in allowing closing argument. Additionally, because
neither party was allowed to present closing argument, Ms. Tanner
could not have been unduly prejudiced.

14

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION
OF THE MARTIAL PROPERTY.
Trial courts have considerable discretion in creating
equitable orders that divide marital property.

Potter v. Potter,

845 P.2d 272 (Utah App, 1993); Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193,
198 (Utah App. 1992); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah
App. 1990).

This Court stated:

"[w]e afford the trial court

considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property
interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of
validity."

Watson. 837 P.2d at 5 (quoting Naranio v. Naranjo,

751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988)).

The overriding

consideration in a divorce action "is that the ultimate division
be equitable," not necessarily exactly equal.

Id. at 6.

In

order for Ms. Tanner to prevail on the issue of an inequitable
marital property division, she must show that the trial court
committed a "clear abuse of discretion."

Id.

This Court has

held that with regard to property division "on appeal from a
judgment of the trial court, our role is not to substitute our
own findings for those of the trial court, but to examine the
record for evidence supporting the judgment."

Baker v. Baker 226

Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Shioii v. Shioii.
712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985)).
15

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that it is "inappropriate
for this court to reverse on an isolated item of property or debt
distribution.

Further, this court must examine the entire

distribution to determine if the trial court abused its
discretion."

Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1148 (quoting Boyle v. Boyle,

735 P.2d 669, 670-71 (Utah App. 1987)).

Therefore, a trial

court's determination on any one issue of property or debt
distribution is not necessarily grounds for reversal.
Ms. Tanner attacks the property division on the basis that
the trial court accepted the values stated on Defendant's
exhibits.

However, "[w]hen considering testimony regarding

valuation of property, the trial court 'is entitled to give
conflicting opinions whatever weight [it] deems appropriate.'"
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App. 1989).

Based upon

the evidence, the trial court specifically found Mr. Swensen's
values of the marital property to be more credible and accepted
those values.
The trial court found the expert testimony of Mr. Shields,
Mr. Swensen's expert, regarding the value of Mr. Swensen's law
practice more credible because Mr. Shields had experience in
valuing sole law practitioners' business.

(R. 116). Mr. Shields

made an on-site visit to Mr. Swensen's firm to value equipment,
16

furniture, and fixtures.

(R. 117). Mr. Shields considered such

an on-site inspection of the property essential in an accurate
valuation since one should consider the condition of the firm's
equipment, furniture, and fixtures.

(R.

120). In contrast to

Mr. Shield's testimony, Ms. Tanner's expert failed to discount
aged account receivables, although it was his general practice to
do so.

(R. 10). Moreover, Ms. Tanner's expert failed to

physically inspect the property, had no personal experience in
valuing a law firm, and prepared several other general
valuations, some of which used improper basis for his different
conclusions.

(R. 8-10).

Respecting the distribution of the personal marital
property, Mr. Swensen inspected the personal marital property at
the Lincoln Lane residence several days before trial.

(R. 110).

He also valued the parties automobiles pursuant to their Blue
Book values.

Id.

The value of the Lincoln Lane residence was

based upon a recent real estate appraisal placed in evidence.
(R. 112). Additionally, Mr. Swensen's proposed distribution did
not value any assets which Ms. Tanner might have obtained through
inheritance or gifts.

(R. 187).

Ms. Tanner argues that the trial court accepted the values
stated on Mr. Swensen's proposed property distribution even
though Mr. Swensen claimed a zero value in personal property for
17

himself.

Ms. Tanner ignores the fact that Mr. Swensen's

testimony as to the proposed property distribution was the
personal marital property in Ms. Tanner's possession had a net
value of $5,000 over the personal property to be awarded to Mr.
Swensen.

(R. 110). The trial court's valuation of the property

is soundly based upon the evidence and should not be disturbed.
Ms. Tanner contends that the trial court did not take into
consideration her "special circumstances" in dividing the real
property.

However, there is nothing in the record indicating

that Ms. Tanner was the victim of special circumstances or
required any special consideration.
Ms. Tanner argues that she does not have any income from the
properties she received to support herself.

There was no

evidence that the marital property included any income producing
property, nor did she request the same.

The division of property

need not provide Ms. Tanner with income producing property.

Ms.

Tanner has failed to provide any authority to support her
argument that she must be awarded income producing assets.
Even so, Ms. Tanner has received income producing assets.
Ms. Tanner has an eight percent (8%) interest in Tanner, Inc.
from which she derives income. (Tr. 5 ) . Ms. Tanner's ownership
of Tanner, Inc. was awarded to Ms. Tanner as separate property
and not as a distribution of marital property.
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Ms. Tanner

personally receives income from the sale of assets by Tanner,
Inc.

(R. 82-83).

Ms. Tanner has an eight percent (8%) interest

in the $305,000 balance owing on the contract balance payable
over a ten year period.

Id.

Further, Ms. Tanner was awarded

one-half, or $92,000, of the parties' marital property in assets
from which she may generate income.

Id.

The property awarded to

Mr. Swensen generates no income except for the work product from
his professional practice.

Including the Tanner, Inc. assets

awarded to Ms. Tanner, after the divorce Mr. Swensen has a lesser
net worth than Ms. Tanner.
Ms. Tanner contends that during the marriage she had no
control or access to marital funds, apparently implying some
inappropriateness on the part of Mr. Swensen.

However, control

of the marital assets is irrelevant in the award of the marital
assets.

This is particularly true in the present circumstances,

since there is no evidence exists that the marital property was
depleted because of Mr. Swensen's control.
Specifically, Ms. Tanner complains that Mr. Swensen used
marital funds for the payment of his attorney's fees in the
amount of $3,000 - $4,000.

(R. 163). However, Mr. Swensen's

attorney's fees were charged against his portion of the marital
property and were not charged against Ms. Tanner's portion of
marital property.

The payment of attorney fees by Mr. Swensen
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did not reduce the total marital property to be distributed
between the parties since the amount paid was added into his
share of the proposed distribution of property.

(R. 185-186).

Thus, Ms. Tanner's marital property distribution was not reduced
by what Mr. Swensen paid in attorney's fees.
Ms. Tanner fails to note that prior to legal representation
by Ms. McConkie, Ms. Tanner had access to marital funds and used
those marital resources to pay legal fees to her former attorneys
in the sum of at least $5,000.

(R. 67). Additionally, Ms.

Tanner had a garage sale at the Lincoln Lane residence where
marital assets were sold in order to pay for a self-esteem
training course for Ms. Tanner. (R. 89). Accordingly, Ms. Tanner
reduced the total marital estate to be divided.
Ms. Tanner also complains that Mr. Swensen paid off a
student loan with marital funds.
debt and legal obligation.

The student loan was a marital

Ms. Tanner testified at trial that

she should bear one-half of the liability of marital debts and
obligations.

(R. 62). Therefore, it was appropriate to pay the

student loan with marital property.
Ms. Tanner argues that Finlayson v. Finlayson controls.
P.2d 843, 849 (Utah App. 1994).

874

However, the present case is

distinguishable from Finlayson, where the Utah Court of Appeals
held that the trial court abused its discretion in crediting the
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husband's payments to his mother as a discharge of marital debt.
In the Finlayson case there was dispute regarding whether the
loan from the husband's mother was actually an enforceable debt
or a gift.

In the present case, there is no such controversy.

The student loan discharged by Mr. Swensen was a legally
enforceable contractual obligation to an independent third party,
Student Loan Servicing Corporation, incurred during the marriage
for the benefit of both parties.
The Court should note that the Appellant's Addendum C and D
to her brief contains financial declarations which were prepared
by the parties and filed with the trial court several months
before trial.

The financial declarations were not evidence

introduced at trial. While untested financial declarations are
an acceptable basis for temporary awards, trial evidence is the
basis for making final awards.
The trial court's division and award of the marital property
was well within the bounds of its discretion.

Ms. Tanner

received all of the equity in the Lincoln Lane residence.
Pursuant to Ms. Tanner's own appraiser of the Lincoln Lane
residence, there are no repairs needed on the house.

(R. 80).

In contrast, Mr. Swensen is presently renting an unfurnished
house. (R. 142). Not only did Ms. Tanner received one-half of
the parties' marital estate, she also received her eight percent
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(8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc. free and clear of any
claim by Mr. Swensen with significant value.

Ms. Tanner actually

received more than Mr. Swensen in tangible assets.

Ms. Tanner

has not met the burden of showing that "there was a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Watson, 837 P.2d at 5.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND APPLIED THE JONES
FACTORS IN AWARDING ALIMONY.
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony.

In

reviewing the trial court's award of alimony, the appellate court
will not disturb the trial court's award absent a showing of
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Chambers v. Chambers.

840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d
96, 100 (Utah 1986)).

Utah law requires that the trial court

consider three factors in determining a reasonable award of
alimony:

(1) the financial condition and needs of the requesting

spouse; (2) the ability of the requesting spouse to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.
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Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333

(citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988));
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); and Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

These three factors are

herein referred to as the "Jones factors" as identified in
Appellant's brief.
If the trial court considered the Jones factors, the
appellate court will not disturb the trial court's alimony award
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

Morgan, 854 P.2d at 567 (quoting

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)); accord
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Utah 1977); Rappleye
v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993).
First, the trial court considered Ms. Tanner's present
financial condition and needs.

The trial court found that Ms.

Tanner had monthly expenses in the amount of $2,885 per month and
imputable income of $1,000 per month.

(Tr. 4). The trial court

held that Ms. Tanner had a present need for alimony and awarded
her $700 per month for two years.

(Tr. 4-5). Based upon Ms.

Tanner's testimony regarding graduation with her Master's degree,
the trial court found that Ms. Tanner required assistance for a
two year period of time.

Ms. Tanner testified that upon

graduation she will earn $20,000 per year.

(R. 94).

Ms. Tanner also testified that she pays off her credit cards
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monthly and has no debt.

(R. 60). Further, there is evidence

that Ms. Tanner has disposable income.

Ms. Tanner purchased a

computer for $1,500 (R. 63), voluntarily enrolled and paid for
self-esteem training in the amount of $2,800 (R. 88-89) for
herself and her daughter, and gave charitable contributions in
the amount of $1,600.

(R. 99).

Second, the trial court made findings regarding Ms. Tanner's
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself.

The trial

court found that Ms. Tanner had actual income and imputable
income in the amount of $1,000 per month.

The trial court

computed Ms. Tanner's income by calculating (1) the $8,000 she
received from distribution of the family corporation, (2) the
$1,500 she is capable of earning teaching art classes in the
summer, and (3) the $2,500 she received as a student stipend.
The trial court divided the 12,000 attributable as yearly income
to Ms. Tanner to conclude that she had an income of $1,000 per
month.

(Tr. 3).

Evidence in the records exists to establish that the trial
judge considered Ms. Tanner's financial condition and ability to
support herself.

The record shows that Ms. Tanner received

various distributions from Tanner, Inc. over the marriage
including distributions of $8,000 per year for each of the last
two years, one distribution in the amount of $4,000, and two
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others in the amount of $2,000 each.

(R. 49, 74-75).

Ms. Tanner

owns an eight percent (8%) ownership interest in Tanner, Inc.
valued at approximately $36,758 plus an eight percent (8%)
interest in the unknown value of 3,500 acres of real property and
150 head of beef cattle.

(R. 84-86).

The record shows that Ms.

Tanner owns eight percent (8%) interest on the $305,000 contract
balance from Tanner, Inc.'s sale of a trading post payable over
ten years, id.

The record is devoid of evidence that Ms. Tanner

will not receive such distributions in the future.
Ms. Tanner is voluntarily enrolled in school and is
voluntarily underemployed.

(R. 60). She voluntarily elected not

to teach the summer art classes that she taught in the past from
which she received $1,500 annual income.

(R. 87).

The trial court also examined Ms. Tanner's educational
status and career goals. Ms. Tanner has a secretarial degree
from BYU.

(R. 22). She worked full time from 1979 through 1982,

when Mr. Swensen finished law school.

(R. 59). Ms. Tanner

received her bachelor's degree from BYU as recently as 1989.
22).

(R.

Ms. Tanner testified that she is going to school to be

retrained.

(R. 93). The trial court found that Ms. Tanner is

presently enrolled at the University of Utah in a graduate
program which she will complete within two years with a Masters
Degree in Expressive Therapy.

(R. 23-24).
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Further, the trial

court found that upon graduation Ms. Tanner expects to earn
$20,000 per year.

(R. 94). The trial court carefully evaluated

Ms. Tanner's financial condition and ability to support herself
in awarding rehabilitative alimony, holding that in two years
she, by her own testimony, will have income of at least $20,000
and in two years her need for alimony will cease since she will
then be able to provide for herself.
Third, in the Jones factors, the trial court made a specific
finding as to Mr. Swensen's ability to provide support.

In

weighing Mr. Swensen's disposable earnings of $3,671 per month
against his monthly expenses of $2,108, and $1,286 child support
obligation, the trial court concluded that Mr. Swensen had an
ability to pay alimony in an amount of no more than $700 per
month.

(Tr. 4). Thus, Mr. Swensen's monthly expenses and court-

ordered monthly obligations amount to $4,094.00.
Ms. Tanner argues that she will not be able to maintain the
same standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.

Based

upon the evidence and the trial court's finding, any inadequacy
in the amount of the alimony award is limited by the family's
limited resources and Mr. Swensen's inability to pay any more for
monthly support.

Therefore, neither party will be able to

maintain the pre-divorce lifestyle.
The basic undisputed evidence in the record explains the
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basis for the trial court's award of alimony.

Where evidence

exists to support the trial court's decision regarding each of
these three factors, the appellate court will not reweigh the
evidence.

Watson, 837 P.2d at 5.
POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING
INCOME TO MS. TANNER BASED ON HER HISTORICAL INCOME.
Ms. Tanner claims that the trial court erred by imputing
income to Ms. Tanner in the amount of $1,500 for teaching summer
art classes, and in the amount of $8,000 from Tanner, Inc.
However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in basing
its alimony award on Ms. Tanner's historical income.

Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7) authorizes the court to impute
income in determining support obligations:

"(b) If income is

imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community."
7.5(7)(b) (1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-

The trial court imputed income to

Ms. Tanner after careful consideration of Ms. Tanner's employment
history and educational qualifications.
The record and testimony reflect that in 1979 Ms. Tanner was
employed at a rate of $6.00 per hour as a graduate assistant and
secretary.

(R. 23-24).

Since that time, Ms. Tanner has acquired
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a bachelor's degree and enrolled in a graduate program.
Moreover, the judge made a specific finding as to Ms. Tanner's
"work history" of receiving $1,500 for teaching summer art
classes. (Tr. 3). Ms. Tanner is voluntarily enrolled in a
graduate program at the University of Utah and is voluntarily
underemployed.

(R. 60). There is no evidence in the record that

Ms. Tanner cannot teach summer art classes while she is enrolled
as a student in her graduate program.
The trial court also found that Ms. Tanner had imputable
income of $8,000 per year from Tanner, Inc.

Contrary to Ms.

Tanner's argument, there is no evidence in the record that Ms.
Tanner will not receive continuing large distributions from
Tanner, Inc. in the future. (R. 83, 84 & 86). The evidence
clearly establishes that Tanner, Inc. has a large number of
valuable assets including:

3,500 acres in the high New Mexico

desert, 150 head of beef cattle, $125,000 in vehicles and
equipment, $305,000 contract balance, $4,700 checking account and
$24,700 money market account.

(R. 84-86).

The assets in Tanner,

Inc. have considerable value of which Ms. Tanner owns an eight
percent (8%) interest.

If Ms. Tanner does not receive stock

distributions from Tanner, Inc. in the future, she could
liquidate its assets. Ms. Tanner's comment that she was informed
by her father that she will not be receiving any more large
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disbursements is hearsay which was objected to and sustained on
two occasions in the record.

(R. 51, 98). Ms. Tanner's argument

based upon purported facts which were objected to and sustained
by the trial court violative of trial and appellate procedure.
Thus, the trial court formulated its alimony award based
upon the Jones factors.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING
MS. TANNER INCOME FROM EARNINGS RECEIVED FROM HER INTEREST
IN HER FAMILY'S CORPORATION.
The Utah courts have adopted the general rule that inherited
property is separate property from the marital estate and not
subject to distribution upon divorce.

Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d

1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1990); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen 760
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).

Ms. Tanner appears to contend that

any distributions that she receives from Tanner, Inc., is "preinheritance or pre-marital property," rather than income or
imputed income.

However, it is clearly within the trial court's

discretion to attribute the distributions Ms. Tanner receives
from Tanner, Inc. as gross or imputed "income."
Clearly, the distributions from Tanner, Inc. are "income."
Ms. Tanner explicitly testified that the disbursements from
Tanner, Inc. were "income."

(R. 90). Ms. Tanner further

testified that Mr. Swensen prepared the parties' tax returns.
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(R. 86). Mr. Swensen is a Certified Public Accountant.

He

testified that he prepared all the tax returns for the family and
that he did so pursuant to generally accepted accounting
principles.

(R. 103). Mr. Swensen further testified that each

year Ms. Tanner would receive a Form K-1 allocating the taxable
distributions from Tanner, Inc.

(R. 104-105).

Form K-1

allocates items of income gain, loss, and deduction to the
individual shareholders in proportion to their stock ownership.
(R. 105). Ms. Tanner and the other shareholders of Tanner, Inc.
would receive a Form K-1 representing taxable income which should
be included in their respective individual income taxes.

Id.

Corporate income was taxable to Ms. Tanner and Mr. Swensen was
responsible for including Ms. Tanner's Form K-ls as income on the
parties' joint tax returns.

The Form K-ls evidence distributions

received by Ms. Tanner for income tax purposes and are clear
evidence of income.

Pursuant to the Form K-ls received into

evidence, the actual distributions received by Ms. Tanner from
Tanner, Inc. amounting to $2,000 for 1989, $2,000 for 1990,
$4,000 for 1991, $8,000 for 1992, and $8,000 for 1993 ($24,000)
were income from the asset and not a distribution of an asset.
(R. 131).
Section 78-45-7.5(1)(b) also provides for determination of
imputed and gross income.

That provision clearly states that
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gross income includes "dividends."
7.5(1)(b) (1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-

The distributions that Ms. Tanner

received were distributions declared by Tanner, Inc.
Arguendo,

even if the actual distributions were considered

"pre-inheritance or premarital property" as suggested by Ms.
Tanner, the evidence establishes that those distributions were
commingled and used by the parties to pay family taxes,
obligations, and other family expenditures.

(R. 49). Thus, in

any case the prior distributions lost their identity and became
marital property.

Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 263 (citing Burt, 799

P.2d at 1168) .
In accordance with Utah law, the trial court properly held
that Ms. Tanner's eight percent (8%) interest in her family
corporation was pre-inheritance/premarital property.

However,

the evidence clearly established that the distributions which Ms.
Tanner received during the marriage were income and not a
distribution of assets.

(R. 84). Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by imputing income to Ms. Tanner from the
earnings actually received from her interest in Tanner, Inc.
since the basis for her income was the sale of a trading post on
a ten year contract which has a balance payable of $305,000.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE
ALIMONY AWARD TO TWO YEARS.
Ms. Tanner also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting her alimony award to two years.
court's award of alimony is rehabilitative in nature.

The trial
The trial

court found that Ms. Tanner is presently enrolled at the
University of Utah in a graduate program which she will complete
within two years with a Masters Degree in Expressive Therapy.
(Tr. 5, R. 23-24).

The trial court specifically found that upon

graduation Ms. Tanner expects to be able to earn $20,000 per
year, which together with the child support which she receives
from Mr. Swensen will be more than adequate to meet her needs as
established by her testimony.

(Tr. 5). Finding that Ms. Tanner

will complete her graduate schooling within two years, the trial
court awarded alimony of $700 per month for those two years.
(Tr. 5). The trial court's award is generous based upon the fact
that Ms. Tanner could finish as early as one year.

The trial

court appropriately found that Ms. Tanner will not have
sufficient income for the first two years following the divorce.
However, after two years Ms. Tanner will be able to produce
sufficient income.
Unlike the facts in the Jones case, Ms. Tanner has a number
of marketable skills as evidenced by her secretarial degree, her
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art degree, and she has worked intermittently throughout the
marriage.

Ms. Tanner worked full time in clerical positions up

through 1982, when Mr. Swensen finished law school.

(R. 59).

Since she received her art degree in 1989, Ms. Tanner has
regularly taught summer art classes.

(R. 87). Further

distinguishable from Jones, Ms. Tanner has recently spent a
substantial amount of time obtaining higher education for herself
while being supported by Mr. Swensen.

Within the last five

years, she has enhanced her marketability by completing a fouryear art degree.

Ms. Tanner is presently completing a Master's

degree from which she expects to benefit from an income of
$20,000 per year.
"The purposes of an alimony award include enabling the
receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard
of living enjoyed during the marriage," and preventing him or her
from becoming a public charge.

Munns, 790 P.2d at 118; Noble v.

Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988).

The trial court

carefully considered Ms. Tanner's ability to maintain, as nearly
as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
Moreover, the trial judge took measures to ensure that Ms. Tanner
will not become a public charge.
Based upon the trial court's findings, Ms. Tanner has
received over $92,000 worth of marital property in assets, has an
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eight percent (8%) interest in Tanner Family Corporation, will
receive $700.00 a month for over 24 months ($16,800.00) in
temporary support, and upon completion of her Master's degree,
she thereafter expects to earn $20,000 a year.

(Tr. 5-6).

Notably, Ms. Tanner owns an eight percent (8%) interest in the
ten year contract for the sale of Tanner, Inc.'s trading post
which has a contract balance of $305,000.
will not become a public charge.

Ms. Tanner is not, and

See Munns, 790 P.2d at 118.

The evidence at trial further established that Ms. Tanner
has disposable income as evidenced by her testimony of monthly
payoff of her credit card obligations, computer purchase,
enrollment in self-esteem training courses, and charitable
contributions.

(R. 60, 63, 88-89, 99).

Contrary to Ms. Tanner's argument, terminating Ms. Tanner's
alimony in two years is not "speculative and pure conjecture."
The Judge's findings were based upon Ms. Tanner's testimony
regarding her expectations and opinions of obtaining employment
that would enable her to support herself.

By Ms. Tanner's own

calculations she will complete her Master's degree and her thesis
within two years.

(R. 94). Further, Ms. Tanner testified that

if she decides not to write a thesis, she may be finished within
a year.

(R. 95). The trial court gave Ms. Tanner the benefit of

any doubt that she will not complete a thesis and finish school
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early in making its rehabilitative alimony award.

Thus, there

was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's consideration of
the evidence and limiting of the alimony award to two years.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DECLINING TO
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO EITHER PARTY.
The trial court has discretion to either award or deny
attorney's fees.
App. 1988).

Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah

This Court has held that "[t]he award must be based

on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees."

Willey v. Willey, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43

(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
App. 1991)).
First, Ms. Tanner has not demonstrated financial need for
assistance in discharging her attorney's fees as required by
Willey and Bell.

Id.

Based upon the evidence, the trial court

specifically found that Ms. Tanner would not need assistance in
the payment of her attorney's fees. (Tr. 6). The findings of the
trial court are supported by the fact that Ms. Tanner has no
outstanding debt and pays off her credit cards monthly.

(R. 60).

Additionally, Ms. Tanner has sufficient disposable income
evidenced by a recent computer purchase ($1,500), expenditures
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for self-esteem training courses ($2,800), and charitable
contributions ($1,600).

(R. 60, 63, 88-89, 99).

As further evidence of Ms. Tanner's disposable income, she
has retained three different attorneys to represent her in this
matter.

(R. 35). The first two attorneys were dismissed because

Ms. Tanner believed, as a lay person, they were unqualified to
handle her matter.

(R. 35-36).

Prior to representation by Ms.

McConkie, Ms. Tanner paid her former attorneys fees in the amount
of approximately $5,000.

(R. 35). Thus, the record demonstrates

that Ms. Tanner has been able to pay her attorneys fees in the
past.
The trial court also found that Ms. Tanner was not in need
of assistance to pay her attorney's fees based upon the property
distribution and other sources of income available to her.
5-6).

(Tr.

Ms. Tanner received $92,000 of the marital estate and a

sizable interest in the Tanner, Inc.

Id.

Therefore, the trial

court was "persuaded that [Ms. Tanner] would not need assistance
in the payment of her attorney's fees."

(Tr. 6 ) .

Second, according to Bell and Willey, the receiving spouse
must demonstrate the ability of the other spouse to pay their
attorney's fees.
P.2d at 493.

Willey, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43; Bell, 810

In this case, the trial court found that neither

party demonstrated the ability of the other spouse to pay
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attorney's fees.

Specifically the trial court evaluated Mr.

Swensen's disposable earnings of $3,671 per month against his
reasonable monthly expenses of $2,108, child support obligation
of $1,286, and alimony obligation of $700, and made a finding
that Mr. Swensen did not have an ability to pay any more to Ms.
Tanner in the way of assistance or support.

(Tr. 4).

Third, there is no evidence of need or the reasonableness of
the requested fees.

Bell, 810 P.2d at 493; Willey, 227 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 43. Attorney's fees should be denied where there is no
evidentiary basis for attorney's fees.

Delatore v. Delatore, 680

P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980);
Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) (holding that an
attorney's fee may not be awarded "where there is nothing in the
record to sustain the award, either by way of evidence or by
stipulation of the parties as to how the court may fix it").
In the present case, the trial court expressly found that
there was no evidentiary basis upon which to make an order for
attorney's fees to be paid by either Mr. Swensen or Ms. Tanner.
(Tr. 6). Moreover, there was no testimony from Ms. Tanner
regarding her need for attorney's fees or inability to pay
attorney's fees in direct examination or otherwise.

(R. 192).

Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
regarding attorney's fees.
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POINT VII
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL JUDGE
DISALLOWING THE PARTIES FROM PRESENTING CLOSING ARGUMENT.
The trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying both
parties the opportunity to present closing argument.

The present

case is easily distinguishable from the Bunnell v. Industrial
Commission of Utah case cited by Appellant.
1987).

740 P.2d 1331 (Utah

In the Bunnell case, the Utah Supreme Court held that due

process was denied where several unacceptable factors
demonstrated that the administrative law judge's conduct was not
impartial.

Id. at 1333-34. Mere dicta in the Bunnell case

suggests that the judge "was also intolerant of counsel's
argument on behalf of plaintiff . . . [and] refused to listen to
closing argument."

The administrative law judge then "told the

plaintiff's counsel to save the argument for rehearing,
indicating that he had already decided to hold against plaintiff
without even examining the medical records."

Id.

Unlike the

Bunnell case, Ms. Tanner was not prejudiced, because neither
party was allowed to present closing argument.

The trial judge

made no indication that he had already made a decision against
Ms. Tanner.
The issues in this case were largely factual.

The parties

were not inhibited in their ability to present the facts or
evidence.

Ms. Tanner could have filed a trial brief, but chose
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not to.

The trial judge merely disallowed the parties from

arguing the law in closing arguments.

The present divorce matter

did not involve issues of complex law requiring a presentation
and explanation of case law.

The trial judge is very familiar

with the law and legal standards in divorce proceedings.

No such

argument was needed for the trial court to come to an equitable
resolution of the issues.

Divorce matters are heard before a

trial judge rather than a jury where argument and instruction may
be required.

Neither party presented closing argument.

It was

within the trial judge's discretion to deny both parties'
presentation of closing arguments.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Tanner contends that the court did not follow the Jones
factors in making its findings relating to alimony, property
division, and attorney's fees.

However, in analysis, it is

evident that the trial court's findings support those very
factors.

The trial court clearly and equitably considered each

of the Jones factors in making its findings relating to property
distribution, support, and attorney's fees.
Ms. Tanner distorts the facts and ignores the trial court's
findings Ms. Tanner received over one-half of the marital assets
value at $92,000, she received an eight percent (8%) interest in
Tanner, Inc. and its income ($36,758 plus 8% interest in 3,600
39

acres and 150 head of cattle), continues to receive $700.00 a
month for over 24 months ($16,800.00) in temporary support.

Upon

completion of her Master's degree, she will have marketable
skills from which she expects to earn at least $20,000 a year.
In reality, Ms. Tanner received more tangible assets than did Mr.
Swensen.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be

affirmed.
DATED this / O day of October, 1994.

Respectfully submitted,

L
(Kenneth A. Okazaki,
Esq.
5
RINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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Asset Sheet For Tanner Inc.
Approximately:
1.
3,500 acres in high New Mexico desert (value unknown
without appraisal).
2.

150 heads of beef cattle (value presently unknown).

3.

$125,000.00—vehicles and equipment.

4.

$305,000.00—contract balance.

5.

$4,786.00—checking account balance.

6.

$24,700.00—Money Market Account.

